Internet and Network Economics

1. Front Matter

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2. Invited Talks 1: Special Session

   1. Mechanism Design Theory: How to Implement Social Goals

      • Eric Maskin

      Pages 1-1

   2. Thirty Years of Chinese Economic Reform: Reasons for Its Success and Future Directions

      • Lawrence J. Lau

      Pages 2-3

3. Invited Talks 2: Plenary Session

   1. Average Distance, Diameter, and Clustering in Social Networks with Homophily

      • Matthew O. Jackson

      Pages 4-11

   2. Assignment Exchanges

      • Paul Milgrom

      Pages 12-12

   3. Search Engine Ad Auctions

      • Hal R. Varian

      Pages 13-13

   4. Computational Economy Equilibrium and Application

      • Yinyu Ye

      Pages 14-14

4. Invited Talks 3: Tutorial Session

   1. Four Graph Partitioning Algorithms

      • Fan Chung Graham

      Pages 15-15

   2. Dynamic Spectrum Management: Optimization and Game Theoretic Formulations

      • Zhi-Quan (Tom) Luo

      Pages 16-16

   3. Some Recent Results in Algorithmic Game Theory

      • Christos Papadimitriou

      Pages 17-17

   4. The Elements of General Equilibrium Theory

      • Herbert E. Scarf

      Pages 18-18

5. Session A.1: Market Equilibrium

   1. A Fast and Simple Algorithm for Computing Market Equilibria

      • Lisa Fleischer, Rahul Garg, Sanjiv Kapoor, Rohit Khandekar, Amin Saberi

      Pages 19-30

   2. A FPTAS for Computing a Symmetric Leontief Competitive Economy Equilibrium

      • Zhisu Zhu, Chuangyin Dang, Yinyu Ye

      Pages 31-40

   3. Online and Offline Selling in Limit Order Markets

      • Kevin L. Chang, Aaron Johnson

      Pages 41-52

   4. Predictive Pricing and Revenue Sharing

      • Bobji Mungamuru, Hector Garcia-Molina

      Pages 53-60

   5. Dual Payoffs, Core and a Collaboration Mechanism Based on Capacity Exchange Prices in Multicommodity Flow Games

      • Luyi Gui, Özlem Ergun

      Pages 61-69

6. Session B.1: Congestion Games

   1. Graphical Congestion Games

      • Vittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli, Michele Flammini, Luca Moscardelli

      Pages 70-81

   2. How Hard Is It to Find Extreme Nash Equilibria in Network Congestion Games?

      • Elisabeth Gassner, Johannes Hatzl, Sven O. Krumke, Heike Sperber, Gerhard J. Woeginger

      Pages 82-93

   3. On the Road to \(\mathcal{PLS}\)-Completeness: 8 Agents in a Singleton Congestion Game

      • Dominic Dumrauf, Burkhard Monien

      Pages 94-108

   4. Conflicting Congestion Effects in Resource Allocation Games

      • Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir

      Pages 109-117

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2008, held in Shanghai, China, in December 2008. The 68 revised full papers presented together with 10 invited talks were carefully reviewed and selected from 126 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on market equilibrium, congestion games, information markets, nash equilibrium, network games, solution concepts, algorithms and optimization, mechanism design, equilibrium, online advertisement, sponsored search auctions, and voting problems.

• Internet
• algorithmic game theory
• anonymity
• approximation algorithms
• competitive auctions
• complexity
• decision making
• dynamic algorithms
• e-commerce
• economic models
• equilibria algorithms
• game theory
• marketing models
• multi-object aucti
• search engine marketing (SEM)

• Computer Science Division, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, USA

  Christos Papadimitriou

• Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong

  Shuzhong Zhang

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