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Cooperative Decision Making in Common Pool Situations

  • Book
  • © 2002

Overview

Authors:
  1. Holger I. Meinhardt

    1. Institute for Statistics and Economic Theory, University of Karlsruhe, Karlsruhe, Germany

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems (LNE, volume 517)

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Table of contents (8 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-viii
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  2. Common Pool Resources

    • Holger I. Meinhardt
    Pages 1-14

  3. A Dynamic Resource Management Problem

    • Holger I. Meinhardt
    Pages 15-38

  4. Cooperative Game Theory

    • Holger I. Meinhardt
    Pages 39-48

  5. The Common Pool Game

    • Holger I. Meinhardt
    Pages 49-95

  6. Convexity of Symmetrical TU-CPR Games

    • Holger I. Meinhardt
    Pages 97-117

  7. Convexity of Asymmetrical TU-CPR Games

    • Holger I. Meinhardt
    Pages 119-174

  8. Concluding Remarks and Outlook on Future Research

    • Holger I. Meinhardt
    Pages 175-179

  9. An Overview of Bifurcation Theory

    • Holger I. Meinhardt
    Pages 181-193

  10. Back Matter

    Pages 181-209
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Keywords

About this book

The monograph gives a theoretical explanation of observed cooperative behavior in common pool situations. The incentives for cooperative decision making are investigated by means of a cooperative game theoretical framework. In a first step core existence results are worked out. Whereas general core existence results provide us with an answer for mutual cooperation, nothing can be said how strong these incentives and how stable these cooperative agreements are. To clarify these questions the convexity property for common pool TU-games in scrutinized in a second step. It is proved that the convexity property holds for a large subclass of symmetrical as well as asymmetrical cooperative common pool games. Core existence and the convexity results provide us with a theoretical explanation to bridge the gap between the observation in field studies for cooperation and the noncooperative prediction that the common pool resource will be overused and perhaps endangered.

Authors and Affiliations

  • Institute for Statistics and Economic Theory, University of Karlsruhe, Karlsruhe, Germany

    Holger I. Meinhardt

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