Internet and Network Economics

1. Front Matter

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2. Recent Developments in Equilibria Algorithms

   • Christos Papadimitriou

   Pages 1-2

3. Partially-Specified Large Games

   • Ehud Kalai

   Pages 3-13

4. Exchange Market Equilibria with Leontief’s Utility: Freedom of Pricing Leads to Rationality

   • Yinyu Ye

   Pages 14-23

5. A Primal-Dual Algorithm for Computing Fisher Equilibrium in the Absence of Gross Substitutability Property

   • Dinesh Garg, Kamal Jain, Kunal Talwar, Vijay V. Vazirani

   Pages 24-33

6. Click Fraud Resistant Methods for Learning Click-Through Rates

   • Nicole Immorlica, Kamal Jain, Mohammad Mahdian, Kunal Talwar

   Pages 34-45

7. Experiments with an Economic Model of the Worldwide Web

   • Georgios Kouroupas, Elias Koutsoupias, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Martha Sideri

   Pages 46-54

8. Coordination Mechanisms for Selfish Scheduling

   • Nicole Immorlica, Li Li, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Andreas Schulz

   Pages 55-69

9. Economic Mechanisms for Shortest Path Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information

   • T. S. Chandrashekar, Yadati Narahari

   Pages 70-79

10. Truth-Telling Reservations

    • Fang Wu, Li Zhang, Bernardo A. Huberman

    Pages 80-91

11. Inapproximability Results for Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Utility Functions

    • Subhash Khot, Richard J. Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, Aranyak Mehta

    Pages 92-101

12. An Auction-Based Market Equilibrium Algorithm for a Production Model

    • Sanjiv Kapoor, Aranyak Mehta, Vijay Vazirani

    Pages 102-111

13. New Algorithms for Mining the Reputation of Participants of Online Auctions

    • Mikołaj Morzy

    Pages 112-121

14. A Simple Characterization for Truth-Revealing Single-Item Auctions

    • Kamal Jain, Aranyak Mehta, Kunal Talwar, Vijay Vazirani

    Pages 122-128

15. Prediction Games

    • Amir Ronen, Lyron Wahrmann

    Pages 129-140

16. Walrasian Equilibrium: Hardness, Approximations and Tractable Instances

    • Ning Chen, Atri Rudra

    Pages 141-150

17. On the Structure and Complexity of Worst-Case Equilibria

    • Simon Fischer, Berthold Vöcking

    Pages 151-160

18. Club Formation by Rational Sharing: Content, Viability and Community Structure

    • W. -Y. Ng, D. M. Chiu, W. K. Lin

    Pages 161-173

19. Subjective-Cost Policy Routing

    • Joan Feigenbaum, David R. Karger, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Rahul Sami

    Pages 174-183

20. Economic Analysis of Networking Technologies for Rural Developing Regions

    • Shridhar Mubaraq Mishra, John Hwang, Dick Filippini, Reza Moazzami, Lakshminarayanan Subramanian, Tom Du

    Pages 184-194

WINE 2005, the First Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2005), took place in Hong Kong, China, December 15-17, 2005. The symposium aims to provide a forum for researchers working in Internet and Network Economic algorithms from all over the world. The final count of electronic submissions was 372, of which 108 were accepted. It consists of the main program of 31 papers, of which the submitter email accounts are: 10 from edu (USA) accounts, 3 from hk (Hong Kong), 2 each from il (Isreal), cn (China), ch (Switzerland), de (Germany), jp (Japan), gr (Greece), 1 each from hp. com, sohu. com, pl (Poland), fr (France), ca (Canada), and in (India). In addition, 77 papers from 20 countries or regions and 6 dot. coms were selected for 16 special focus tracks in the areas of Internet and Algorithmic Economics; E-Commerce Protocols; Security; Collaboration, Reputation and Social Networks; Algorithmic Mechanism; Financial Computing; Auction Algorithms; Online Algorithms; Collective Rationality; Pricing Policies; Web Mining Strategies; Network Economics; Coalition Strategies; Internet Protocols; Price Sequence; Equilibrium. We had one best student paper nomination: “Walrasian Equilibrium: Hardness, Approximations and Tracktable Instances” by Ning Chen and Atri Rudra. We would like to thank Andrew Yao for serving the conference as its Chair, with inspiring encouragement and far-sighted leadership. We would like to thank the International Program Committee for spending their valuable time and effort in the review process.

• Internet
• decision aming
• e-commerce
• e-learning
• economic models
• equilibria algorithms
• grid computing
• market analysis
• marketing models
• multi-agent systems
• network computing
• network management
• online
• security
• service-oriented computing

• Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

  Xiaotie Deng

• Stanford University, Stanford

  Yinyu Ye

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