Psychology as a Moral Science

What does morality have to do with psychology in a value-neutral, postmodern world? According to a provocative new book, everything.

Taking exception with current ideas in the mainstream (including cultural, evolutionary, and neuropsychology) as straying from the discipline’s ethical foundations, Psychology as a Moral Science argues that psychological phenomena are inherently moral, and that psychology, as prescriptive and interventive practice, reflects specific moral principles.

The book cites normative moral standards, as far back as Aristotle, that give human thoughts, feelings, and actions meaning, and posits psychology as one of the critical methods of organizing normative values in society; at the same time it carefully notes the discipline’s history of being sidetracked by overemphasis on theoretical constructs and physical causes—what the author terms “the psychologizing of morality.” This synthesis of ideas brings an essential unity to what can sometimes appear as a fragmented area of inquiry at odds with itself. The book’s “interpretive-pragmatic approach”:

• Revisits core psychological concepts as supporting normative value systems.

• Traces how psychology has shaped society’s view of morality.

• Confronts the “naturalistic fallacy” in contemporary psychology.

• Explains why moral science need not be separated from social science.

• Addresses challenges and critiques to the author’s work from both formalist and relativist theories of morality.

With its bold call to reason, Psychology as a Moral Science contains enough controversial ideas to spark great interest among researchers and scholars in psychology and the philosophy of science.

“This provocative work seeks to provide a response to the question ‘What does morality have to do with psychology in a value-neutral, postmodern world?’ Arguing from an interpretive-pragmatic view, Brinkmann argues that psychology is fundamentally grounded in moral concern. … Brinkmann makes a case for understanding morality as fundamentally embedded in social practices; a case in which figures such as Aristotle, Dewey, Heidegger, MacIntyre, and Charles Taylor loom large in the background.” (Edwin E. Gantt, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 36 (1), 2016)

Svend Brinkmann is Professor of Psychology in the Department of Communication and Psychology at the University of Aalborg, Denmark. His research areas are general psychology and qualitative methods, and he is co-director of the Center for Qualitative Studies at the University of Aalborg and also editor of the journal Qualitative Studies. Svend Brinkmann has published books in Danish about the mind, identity and the philosopher and psychologist John Dewey, and he is co-author (with Steinar Kvale) of the English language book InterViews. In addition, he has published several journal articles about the philosophy of psychology, qualitative methods, moral inquiry, and approaches to human science such as pragmatism, hermeneutics, and discourse analysis.