Constitutional Mythologies

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-viii

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2. Introduction: Constitutional Myths

   • Alain Marciano

   Pages 1-7

3. Consent or Coercion? A Critical Analysis of the Constitutional Contract

   • Randall G. Holcombe

   Pages 9-23

4. Agent Type, Social Contracts, and Constitutional Mythologies

   • Peter Boettke, Alexander Fink

   Pages 25-37

5. Constitutions, Politics, and Identity

   • Alan Hamlin

   Pages 39-51

6. Is the “Veil of Ignorance” in Constitutional Choice a Myth? An Empirical Exploration Informed by a Theory of Power

   • Louis M. Imbeau, Steve Jacob

   Pages 53-69

7. Checks and Balances at the OK Corral: Restraining Leviathan

   • Atin Basuchoudhary, Michael Reksulak, William F. Shughart II

   Pages 71-80

8. Popular Sovereignty: A Case Study from the Antebellum Era

   • Elizabeth Dale

   Pages 81-106

9. Direct Democracy and the Constitution

   • Bruno S. Frey, Alois Stutzer, Susanne Neckerman

   Pages 107-119

10. Parallelisms and Paralogisms in the European Court of Justice

    • Giuseppe Eusepi, Alessandra Cepparulo, Maurizio Intartaglia

    Pages 121-134

11. The Dual Rationale of Judicial Independence

    • Fabien Gélinas

    Pages 135-153

12. Comparison of Central Bank and Judicial Independence

    • George Tridimas

    Pages 155-170

13. Making and Implementing the Rules of the Game: The Political Economy of Constitutional Myths and Rites

    • Jean-Michel Josselin

    Pages 171-174

14. Back Matter

    Pages 175-177

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Our societies obviously rest on common beliefs. These "myths" are tools that help us to develop and build common identities; they form the structure around which societies function. This does not imply that these beliefs are “true,” in the sense that they would be supported by empirical facts. In social matters, myths have undoubtedly important functions to play even if no empirical facts support them. On the other hand, and precisely because they are not discussed, myths may be problematic: they may create illusions, conserve structures that are inefficient and unable to improve the situation of citizens. This is particularly true with constitutions. Constitutions are very important for societies: a constitution is a document — even in societies based on “unwritten” constitutions — which binds citizens together, creating unity among them, and which forms the framework within which our activities take place. As Nobel Prize laureate James Buchanan used to say: constitutions contain the rules of the social game we play in our everyday life. However, constitutions are not frequently debated by citizens. This is why we end up with common beliefs about these constitutions: they are above our heads, around us. We take them, their role, function, and nature as given. The purpose of this volume to investigate and challenge common constitutional myths. Featuring contributions from prominent economists, political scientists, and legal scholars, the chapters in this volume address such myths as “constitutions are binding social contracts,” “constitutions are economic documents” and “constitutions are legal documents.” Illustrating their analyses with historical and contemporary examples from the United States, Canada, and Europe, the authors build a multi-layered approach to understanding constitutions and their implications for social and political influence.

• coercive power
• constitution
• constitutional myth
• constitutional political economy
• democracy

• Faculté d’Economie, Université de Montpellier I and LAMETA-C, MONTPELLIER, France

  Alain Marciano

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