Uncertainty, Rationality, and Agency

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-x

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2. The No Probabilities for Acts-Principle

   • Marion Ledwig

   Pages 1-10

3. A Logic for Inductive Probabilistic Reasoning

   • Manfred Jaeger

   Pages 11-78

4. Rationality as Conformity

   • Hykel Hosni, Jeff Paris

   Pages 79-115

5. On The Structure of Rational Acceptance: Comments on Hawthorne and Bovens

   • Gregory R. Wheeler

   Pages 117-134

6. Logic and the Foundations of the Theory of Games and Decisions: Introduction

   • Giacomo Bonanno

   Pages 135-138

7. A Simple Modal Logic for Belief Revision

   • Giacomo Bonanno

   Pages 139-174

8. Prolegomena to Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision

   • Hans P. van Ditmarsch

   Pages 175-221

9. From Knowledge-Based Programs to Graded Belief-Based Programs, Part I: On-Line Reasoning

   • Noël Laverny, Jérôme Lang

   Pages 223-267

10. Order-Independent Transformative Decision Rules

    • Martin Peterson, Sven Ove Hansson

    Pages 269-288

11. A Pragmatic Solution for the Paradox of Free Choice Permission

    • Katrin Schulz

    Pages 289-323

12. A Logical Framework for Convention

    • Giacomo Sillari

    Pages 325-346

13. Back Matter

    Pages 347-349

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This book collects all the papers that appeared in 2005 in Kno- edge, Rationality and Action (KRA), a journal published as a s- cial section of Synthese, which addresses contemporary issues in epistemic logic, belief revision, game and decision theory, rational agency, planning and theories of action. As such, the special section appeals to researchers from Computer Science, Game Theory, Ar- ?cial Intelligence, Philosophy, Knowledge Representation, Logic and Agents, addressing issues in arti?cial systems that have to gather information, reason about it and then make a sensible decision about what to do next. It will be clear already from the contents pages, that this book indeed re?ects the core of KRA: the papers in this volume address degrees of belief or certainty, and rational agency. The latter has several manifestations: often constraints on the agent’s belief, behaviour or decision making. Moreover, this book shows that KRA indeed represents a ‘loop’ in the behaviour of the agent: after having made a decision, the life of the agent does not end, rather, it will do some sensing or collect otherwise the outcome of its decision, to update its beliefs or knowledge accordingly and make up its mind about the next decision task.

• agents
• knowledge
• logic
• modal logic
• probabilistic reasoning
• uncertainty

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