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Preferences and Procedures

European Union Legislative Decision-Making

  • Book
  • © 2006

Overview

Editors:
  1. Torsten J. Selck

    1. University of Groningen, The Netherlands

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  • By using applied game-theoretic models of EU decision-making, this book found that a simple spatial model that is based on the median voter theorem can outperform more sophisticated multidimensional spatial voting models

  • Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

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Table of contents (8 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-x
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  2. Introduction

    Pages 1-18

  3. Conceptualizing the European Union Legislative Process: Some Insight from the Federalist Papers

    Pages 19-29

  4. Assessing the Current State of the Spatial Models Literature

    Pages 31-37

  5. Spatial Models of Politcs: An Introduction and a Comparison Using Computer Simulation

    Pages 38-47

  6. A Data Set and an Analysis of France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom in EU Legislative Negotiations

    Pages 48-57

  7. Between Power and Luck: The European Parliament in the EU Legislative Process

    Pages 58-71

  8. Evaluating the Predictive Power of a Spatial Model for the European Union Legislative Process

    Pages 72-80

  9. Summary and Conclusions

    Pages 81-84

  10. Back Matter

    Pages 85-99
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Keywords

About this book

Preferences and Procedures presents and tests game-theoretic models of European Union legislative decision-making. It is inspired by the idea of linking statistical testing strategies firmly to formal models of EU policymaking. After describing salient features of the EU legislative process and comparing different models of how the EU negotiates new legislative measures, the models' predictive power is evaluated. On a more general level, Preferences and Procedures answers questions regarding the empirically recognizable effects of institutional arrangements on joint bargaining outcomes.

Editors and Affiliations

  • University of Groningen, The Netherlands

    Torsten J. Selck

About the editor

Torsten J. Selck is working as Assistant Professor of Political Economy at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands.

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